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Abstract
We estimate the eect of exchange rate movements on rm-level wages, using a
representative panel of manufacturing rms. We show that the direction and size of
wage adjustment is shaped by the international exposure of each rm on both the sale
and cost side of the balance sheet, similar to the response of employment documented in
Nucci and Pozzolo (2010). Through the revenue side, wages tend to rise after a currency
depreciation and the eect is more pronounced the higher is the rm's exposure to sales
from exports. Through the expenditure side, a depreciation induces a cut in the rm's
wages, and the eect is larger the higher is the incidence of imported inputs in total
production costs. For a given degree of external orientation, both these eects are
larger for rms with a lower market power. Moreover, we document that the eect of
exchange rates on wages is shaped by (i) the extent of sectoral import penetration in
the domestic market; (ii) the proportion of newly hired workers in each rm in a given
year; and (iii) the composition of the rm's workforce by occupational category.
JEL classications: E24; F16; F31.
Keywords: Exchange Rate; Firms' Foreign Exposure; Wages.
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1 Introduction
A considerable body of empirical literature in international economics uncovers non-negligible
eects of exchange rate movements on the real economy. For example, Campa and Gold-
berg (1999; hereafter, CG) and Nucci and Pozzolo (2001; hereafter, NP) show that currency
swings signicantly aect rm's investment, and NP (2010) and Goldberg and Tracy (2000)
nd similar eects on employment and hours worked.1 From a theoretical perspective, the
typical channel through which exchange rates can aect rms' choices is through changes
in protability. A currency depreciation, for example, causes an increase of the costs of
imported inputs for production, on one side, and an increase in foreign and domestic rev-
enues on the other side. The overall impact is therefore expected to vary considerably across
producers in light of the heterogeneous international orientation on both the export and
imported inputs side of each individual rm (see Bernard et al, 2007).
A parallel strand of empirical literature has studied the consequences of exchange rate move-
ments on the earnings of workers, but without reaching a denitive conclusion. On the one
hand, a group of contributions, focusing on aggregate data at the industry level, uncovers a
signicant wage responsiveness to exchange rate oscillations. In particular, Revenga (1992)
shows that changes in import prices induced by exchange rate swings do aect real wage in
U.S. manufacturing, Goldberg and Tracy (2000), using data disaggregated by states and by
industries, report statistically signicant estimates of the earnings elasticities with respect
to exchange rate, also providing evidence of a pattern of regional dierences in their values,
and CG (2001) document a signicant incidence of exchange rates on wages, that is shown
to vary across industries depending on their trade orientation and competitive structure.
On the contrary, Goldberg and Tracy (2003), using information on individual workers char-
acteristics such as educational attainment and experience, nd that the overall wage eect
1The latter nding contrasts with previous evidence by CG (2001) of a weak employment response to
exchange rates coupled with a signicant impact on real wages; dierently from CG (2001) and most other
studies in this area of literature, NP (2010) use rm- rather than industry-level information and provide
arguments for why the level of disaggregation of the data may aect the estimated impact on employment
to a considerable extent.
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of currency movements is in fact modest, although it can be sizeable for specic groups of
workers.
In this paper we contribute to the literature on the eect of exchange rate uctuations on
real wages relying on microeconomic data from a high quality sample of Italian rms, thus
complementing the NP's (2010) analysis along a parallel dimension. Information on individ-
ual workers, as in Goldberg and Tracy (2003), denitely provides an important perspective,
as it allows to appraise which type of workers experience the largest wage adjustment (if any)
after an exchange rate shock.2 We argue, however, that individual rm characteristics are
of particular relevance in shaping the implications for wages of exchange rate uctuations.
In particular, because of the large heterogeneity across rms along several dimensions, even
within narrowly dened industries, the rm-specic eects of exchange rate on wages can be
to some extent washed out in the aggregation process. This paper therefore analyzes if the
estimated wage response to an exchange rate shock varies across rms in association with
the response of rm protability.
In frictionless and competitive labor markets, the change in protability resulting from an
exchange rate swing is not expected to yield any rm-specic eect on the wages of similar
workers, as each rm is a wage-taker that faces an innitely elastic supply of labor. Any shift
in the marginal revenue product of labor induced by a currency shock generates rm-level
eects on employment, but not on wages. However, this contrasts with the well-established
empirical nding that rm protability does aect its wages, even after controlling for dif-
ferences in the characteristics of the workers (see e.g., Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990, Abowd
and Lemieux, 1993, and Arai, 2003). Indeed, a variety of theoretical models depart from the
simplest auction model of the labor market and yield the prediction that workers are paid a
wage that does depend on the prots and the nancial conditions of their employer.3
2A further notable advantage of individual data is that they allow to appraise the role of exchange rate
on the wage of workers that decide or are forced to change their job (see Kletzer, 2000 and Goldberg and
Tracy, 2003).
3As elucidated by Blanchower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997), for example, an important
class of models feature a bargaining framework where rent-sharing occurs between the rm and its employees,
and this establishes a positive link at the rm level between protability and pay. Alternatively, a competitive
model with temporary informational and search-related frictions implies that the individual rm faces an
upward-sloping labor supply curve, so that a shock to protability, induced for example by an exchange
rate shock, feeds through into the wage rate, not just into employment. Models where labor contracts have
elements of risk-sharing are also conducive to a positive response of the rm wage rate to prots, whose size
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Thus, the combined evidence that the eects of currency swings on protability and labor
demand are heterogeneous across rms, depending on their international exposure, and that
dierences in protability across rms are conducive to dierences in wages of similar workers
calls for an investigation on rm-level data of the exchange rate-wages link. In particular, we
are able to estimate a specic, time-varying responsiveness of the (average) wage to exchange
rate for each individual rm and in doing so we explicitly allow for a number of transmission
channels of the currency shock to the wage rate whose relevance varies from rm to rm.
To provide the motivation for the empirical analysis, following NP (2001; 2010) and CG
(1999; 2001) we refer to a theoretical model that pins down a number of mechanisms through
which exchange rate changes may inuence the wages set by the rm. The prediction that
exchange rates aect not only a rm's labor demand but also the level of its wages is obtained
by assuming that in the short run labor is imperfectly mobile, due to search and informational
frictions that make each employer facing an upward-sloping labor supply curve, rather than
a horizontal one at the economy-wide wage, as if the labor market was perfectly competitive.
In this setting, a currency depreciation causes a surge in equilibrium protability and in the
wage level, through the revenue side of the income account, and the eect is stronger the
higher is the incidence of a rm's sales in the foreign markets. Conversely, through the cost
side, a depreciation causes a reduction of prots and wages, and the eect in turn is stronger
the more a rm relies on imported intermediate inputs. Another prediction of the theoretical
model, also testable with our data, is that, for a given level of rm's external orientation, the
degree of wage sensitivity to exchange rate is inuenced by the market power of the rm. In
particular, the impact on wages can be shown to be more pronounced the lower is the rm's
pricing power in its destination markets (see CG, 2001).
The empirical analysis soundly supports the predictions of the theoretical framework. An
exchange rate devaluation causes an increase in wages that is stronger the higher is the
share of revenues from exports and the lower is the incidence of imported inputs, and such
eects are magnied the lower is the rm's market power in the destination markets. We
also investigate the empirical relevance of a number of additional features that shape the
responsiveness of rm level wages to exchange rate uctuations. First, we study the eect
of the competitive pressure exerted by foreign producers in the rm's domestic market. In
particular, following NP (2010), we investigate whether dierences across industries in the
depends on the degree of relative risk aversion of the workers and the rm.
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degree of import penetration are conducive to diverging patterns in the response of wages
to currency shocks. In doing so, we combine rm-level information on the exposure of
the rm's sales on the domestic product markets with data on import penetration in the
industry to which the rm belongs. We nd that a currency depreciation, by reducing the
competitiveness of importers in the domestic market, increases the protability of domestic
rms and thereby their wages, through the domestic revenue channel. This eect is found
to be stronger the higher is the extent of import penetration and the larger is the degree of
rm's orientation to the domestic product market. Second, we analyze the role of the share
of newly hired workers in shaping the impact of exchange rate movements on the wages set
by the rm. In particular, we consider the hiring rate for each rm and test whether two
rms with a dierent percentage of newly hired employees in a given year, but identical
along all other dimensions (e.g., their international exposure), show a dierent sensitivity of
their wages to exchange rate shocks. We nd that this sensitivity is indeed larger for rms
with a higher hiring rate through both the revenue and the cost sides. Arguably, this result
complements the one obtained on employees data by Goldberg and Tracy (2003), who detect
a signicant eect of exchange rate swings on the size of the adjustment in wages associated
with a transition from one job to another. Finally, whilst our data do not allow to control
for individual worker characteristics such as the skill level, nonetheless we exploit the time-
varying information on the composition of each rm's workforce to examine whether the
wage responsiveness to exchange rate through both the revenue and cost side varies across
rms with dierent incidence of white- versus blue-collar workers. It turns out that it does,
as the wage responsiveness is higher, ceteris paribus, for rms with a higher proportion of
white-collar employees.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical rela-
tionships that guide our empirical analysis and provide motivation for it. Section 3 describes
the data, the empirical specication and the estimation methodology. In Section 4 we report
the empirical results with regard to the baseline specication as well as to additional features
characterizing the wage responsiveness to exchange rate swings. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theoretical framework
2.1 The Model
In this section we present a simple model of the labor market that allows us to illustrate the
mechanisms through which exchange rate swings can induce equilibrium wage adjustment.
Following CG (1999; 2001) and NP (2001; 2010), we consider the optimal conditions for
prot maximization of a rm operating in an imperfectly competitive market. The rm's
problem is dened as:
max
q;q;z;z;L
(q; q; z; z; L; e) = p(q; e)q +
p(q; e)q
e
  zs  z
s(e)
e
  wL; (1)
subject to the technology constraint:
q + q = Q = F (L; z; z):
where q and q are the volumes of production for the domestic and the foreign markets,
respectively, and the inverse demand functions, p(q; e) and p(q; e), have been substituted
into the prot function; L is employment and z and z are the levels of domestically produced
and imported non-labor inputs, respectively; w is the wage and s and s are the prices of the
domestically produced and the imported inputs, respectively, expressed in local currency; e
is the exchange rate, quoted as the number of foreign currency units per domestic currency
unit (i.e., an increase of e is therefore a currency appreciation). The rst order conditions
with respect to q and q for the solution of the constrained maximization problem (1) are:
@p(q; e)
@q
q + p   = 0; (2)
@p(q; e)
@q
q
e
+
p
e
   = 0: (3)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the technology constraint. By dening  and 
as the price elasticities of demand in, respectively, the domestic and the foreign product
market, from Eqs. (2) and (3) we obtain the following relationship linking prices and demand
elasticities in the home and foreign markets:
 = p(1 +
1

) =
p
e
(1 +
1

): (4)
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Similarly, the rst order conditions for prot maximization with respect to z, z and L are:
 s+ @F (L; z; z
)
@z
= 0; (5)
 s
(e)
e
+ 
@F (L; z; z)
@z
= 0; (6)
 w + @F (L; z; z
)
@L
= 0: (7)
By combining Eq. (4) with Eqs. (5)-(7), the following equilibrium conditions are derived,
equating the marginal revenue product of each input to its marginal cost:
@F (L; z; z)
@z
=
s
p(1 + 1

)
; (8)
@F (L; z; z)
@z
=
s(e)
p(1 + 1
 )
; (9)
@F (L; z; z)
@L
=
w
p(1 + 1

)
: (10)
If we assume that technology, F (), is described by a constant return to scale production
function, we can apply Euler's theorem and express total output as follows:
Q = F (L; z; z) =
@F (L; z; z)
@L
L+
@F (L; z; z)
@z
z +
@F (L; z; z)
@z
z: (11)
By dening 1

= (1 + 1

) and 1
 = (1 +
1
 ) as the reciprocals of the mark-up ratios set,
respectively, in the domestic and foreign product markets, and substituting Eqs. (8)-(10)
into Eq. (11), simple algebraic manipulations yield the following equilibrium condition (see
CG, 2001 and NP, 2010):
wL =
pq

+
pq
e
  (sz + s
z
e
): (12)
The above expression characterizes rm's optimal labor demand in the absence of adjustment
costs. Applying the logarithmic transformation and denoting eL as the optimal demand in
the absence of adjustment costs, we obtain:
lnw = ln[
pq

+
pq
e
  (sz + s
z
e
)]  ln eL: (13)
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To allow for the presence of adjustment costs in hiring and ring workers, we assume the
following partial adjustment equation for labor demand:
lnLt = ' lnLt 1 + (1  ') ln eLt; (14)
that postulates that the labor demand in period t depends on the level of employment at
time t   1, and on the optimal level of employment at time t in the absence of adjustment
costs, ln eLt, where ' is the parameter governing the speed of adjustment to the frictionless
equilibrium (NP, 2010).
Combining Eqs. (13) and (14) and introducing the time subscripts where appropriate yield
the following expression
lnwt = ln[
ptqt
t
+
pt q

t
ett
  (stzt + s

t z

t
et
)]  1
1  '(lnLt   ' lnLt 1): (15)
The equation above implies that, if the rm was a wage-taker and faced an innitely elastic
supply of labor at the economy-wide prevailing wage level, an exchange rate shock would
yield a shift in protability and labor demand, which would impact on the rm's equilibrium
employment but leave the wage rate unaltered. Since this contrasts with the well-established
evidence that rm protability is a relevant determinant of workers pay, even when control-
ling for their observable dierences, we depart from the assumption of a perfectly competitive
labor market and consider one of the several frameworks in which rm wages and prots
exhibit comovements. In particular, we consider a modied competitive model of the labor
market in which the labor supply curve slopes upward. This may arise from temporary
frictions resulting from search and mobility costs, informational problems or heterogeneous
worker preferences as suggested for example by Blanchower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and
Oswald (1997).4
To characterize the equilibrium wage we therefore assume that each rm faces the following
labor supply curve:
4Albeit implicitly, the same hypothesis on the labor market is adopted by CG (2001), where wages are
allowed to be dierent across industries in light of a number of sector-specic characteristics.
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lnLt = a0 + a1 lnwt: (16)
By equating labor demand (Eq. 15) and labor supply (Eq. 16), simple manipulations yield
lnwt = A(1  ') ln[p(qt; et)qt

+
p(qt ; et)q

t
et
  (stzt + s
(et)zt
et
)] + A' lnLt 1   a0A; (17)
where A = 1
1 '+a1  0. Dierentiating the above equation with respect to the exchange rate,
it is possible to obtain the following expression for the elasticity of wages, w, with respect
to the exchange rate, e:
d lnwt
d ln et
=
1

[ (1  p;e) + (1  )p;e + (1  s;e)]A(1  '); (18)
where  2 [0; 1] is the share of sales in foreign markets over total sales ;  2 [0; 1] is the
share of production costs for imported inputs in total costs; p;e 2 [ 1; 0] and p;e 2 [0; 1]
are the elasticities of, respectively, domestic and foreign prices with respect to the exchange
rate (i.e., the pass-through elasticities); s;e 2 [0; 1] is the elasticity of foreign input prices
with respect to the exchange rate; and  is the share of labor costs over total revenues. In
deriving the above expression we have assumed for simplicity that there is no distinction
between the mark-up set in the domestic market, , and in the foreign product markets,
. In both cases we have used , which can be interpreted as the average value of the
destination-specic mark-up ratios. Moreover, we have used the fact that, under constant
returns to scale, total revenues can be expressed as the product of production costs (the
wage bill plus intermediate input expenditure) and the mark-up ratio, .
Eq. (18) represents a useful theoretical background for our empirical analysis, providing
a variety of testable implications. The following section discusses more in detail the dif-
ferent channels, explicitly identied in our theoretical model, through which exchange rate
movements aect the equilibrium outcome for the rm wages.
9
2.2 The Channels of Transmission of the Currency Swings to
Wages
Eq. (18) predicts that exchange rate swings aect rm level wages. If we focus on the revenue
side of the rm's balance sheet, a currency depreciation (a reduction of et) has a positive eect
on the rm's marginal revenue product of labor and thereby on the equilibrium wage, as is
shown by the sum of the rst two terms inside brackets in Eq. (18),  (1 p;e)+(1 )p;e,
which is non-positive. In particular, a depreciation is predicted to exert a positive eect on
wages along both the foreign and domestic sales channels. On the export side, the positive
eect on wages of an exchange rate depreciation is larger the higher is the share of foreign
sales in total sales, , i.e. the more a rm is exposed to foreign markets through the export of
its products. On the revenue side as a whole, i.e. including both domestic and foreign sales,
the positive eect on wages of a currency depreciation is also amplied as the export share of
sales, , becomes larger, but this prediction holds true only if the following condition is met:
jp;ej+ p;e < 1, i.e. if the sum of the exchange rate pass-through elasticities (their absolute
value) is less than one (NP, 2010). By contrast, through the cost side of the balance sheet, a
currency depreciation negatively aects the marginal revenue product of labor and thereby
wages, as implied by the the non-negative term (1 s;e) inside brackets in Eq. (18). Again,
the extent of these adjustments depends on the external dependence of the rm on foreign
inputs. This is captured in Eq. (18) by , the share of expenditure for imported inputs in
total costs: the larger is this share, the more pronounced are the negative implications for
wages of a depreciation through this channel of exposure (see CG, 1999; 2001 and NP 2001;
2010).
The theoretical framework illustrated in the previous section highlights other important
features that shape the response of wages to exchange rate swings. First, the degree of
rm's market power, as measured by the rm's mark-up ratio, , does enter Eq. (18),
with the prediction that, everything else being identical for two hypothetical rms (e.g.,
the type of foreign exposure and the pass-through elasticities), the one with a lower degree
of pricing power exhibits a more sizeable elasticity of wages to exchange rate (in absolute
value). Indeed, rms with a lower market power tend to be less capable of absorbing currency
shocks, so that the impact on wages is relatively more pronounced. To see this, recall that
an exchange rate depreciation (e.g. a decrease of e) drives down the export price in the
foreign currency by an amount that depends on the pass-through elasticity, p;e. This price
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decline therefore yields an increase of foreign demand, q { and thereby of protability and
wages { which is larger the higher is the price elasticity of foreign demand, . Given the
negative relationship between the rm's mark-up ratio and the price elasticity of demand,
the sensitivity of wage to currency swings is indeed magnied when the rm's market power
is relatively low.
Another prediction of the model (again see Eq. 18) is that the exchange rate pass-through
elasticities contribute to shape the adjustment of wage in response to currency shocks. The
exchange rate elasticity of the prices set by the rm in the currency of the market of desti-
nation, p;e, ranges from zero (no pass-through) to one (complete pass-through). From Eq.
(18) we note that, for a given level of external orientation on the export side, , the smaller
is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of exchange rate pass-through to foreign prices, p;e,
the larger is the wage response to a shift in et. Indeed, many contributions show that this
exchange rate pass-through elasticity does depend on market structure and in particular on
the extent to which rms' products are dierentiated and the substitution among dierent
variants is large (Yang, 1997). These studies, that include Dornbusch (1987) and Knetter
(1993), show that the pass-through tends to be low if the degree of competition in the foreign
markets is high. Therefore, in the limiting case of a perfectly competitive foreign destina-
tion market, the rm is a price taker, the pass-through elasticity is zero, and the eect of
a depreciation on prots and wages is magnied. This additional channel clearly reinforces
the previous conclusion that the lower is the rm's pricing power, the higher is the exchange
rate sensitivity of protability and thereby wages.
If we focus on rm's competition in the domestic market, we have already established that a
currency depreciation, by making foreign products more expensive, rises the competitiveness
of domestic rms in the home market, thus increasing their sales, their protability as well
as their wages. Eq. (18) predicts that also the exchange rate pass-through elasticity of rm's
prices in the domestic market, p;e, plays an important role in shaping this eect. The value
of this domestic pass-through elasticity ranges from minus one (complete pass-through) to
zero (no pass-through), and again it depends on market structure. Specically, the elasticity
is a decreasing function of the rm's monopoly power in the home market (in absolute
value). In the limiting case of a perfectly competitive domestic destination market, where
the domestic rm is a price taker, a currency appreciation forces it to a one-for-one price
cut (a pass-through elasticity equal to minus one). Thus, a currency appreciation lowers the
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value of domestic sales, protability and wages, and the lower is the rm's market power,
the larger is this decline. The intuition is that the higher the competitive pressure exerted
by foreign producers, the more responsive are domestic sales, protability and wages in the
aftermath of a currency shift. Indeed, the domestic pass-through elasticity reects the degree
of this competitive pressure from foreign producers, and is often assumed to be proportional
to the degree of import penetration in the domestic market (see e.g. Dornsbusch, 1987 and
CG, 2001).
Market structure also shapes the eects of exchange rate uctuations through the cost side
of the balance sheet. The increase in wages caused by an exchange rate appreciation through
a reduction in the expenditure for imported inputs depends on the extent of competition
in the market for intermediate inputs. From Eq. (18), it can be seen that the eect of
exchange rate swings on wages is larger the smaller the pass-through elasticity of foreign
input prices to the exchange rate, s;e, that ranges from zero (no pass-through) to one
(complete pass-through).
As discussed above, the theoretical framework of Section 2.1 allows us to uncover a number of
testable implications on the transmission of exchange rate swings to wages. These theoretical
predictions, summarized by Eq. (18), lend themselves to the empirical scrutiny, to which we
now turn. In doing so, we rst present the rm-level panel data that we use in our analysis.
3 The Data and the Regression Specication
3.1 The Data
The microeconomic data used in the empirical investigation are the the same as those of
NP (2010). They are drawn from two dierent statistical sources. The rst one is the Bank
of Italy's Survey of Investment in Italian Manufacturing (SIM), that is carried out at the
beginning of every year since 1984 on a representative sample of over 1,000 rms, stratied
by industry, size and location. These data are of extremely high quality, thanks also to the
professional expertise of the interviewers, who are ocials of the Bank of Italy establishing
long-term relationships with the rms' managers. Only medium-large rms, dened as those
with more than 50 employees were included in the Survey during the sample period that we
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analyze. We used SIM to gather rm-level information on total revenues and revenues from
exporting, employment and hours worked.
The second source of rm-level data is the Company Accounts Data Service reports, a
database maintained by a consortium among the Bank of Italy and a pool of commercial
banks, collecting information from balance sheets and income statements of a sample of about
40,000 Italian rms. The detailed information from the annual accounts are reclassied to
ensure comparability across rms. From this database we gather rm-level information on
the wage bill, expenditure on intermediate inputs, value added and total sales. Data from
these two sources are merged to construct an unbalanced panel of slightly fewer than 2,400
rms. As in NP (2010), the data used for estimation covers the period 1984-1998. During
these 15 years before the introduction of the euro, the Italian currency Lira experienced
pronounced swings. Coupled with the high degree of international exposure of Italian rms
on both the revenue and the cost side, this provides an ideal setting for our empirical analysis.
We compute the average wage at the rm level as the total wage bill divided by the average
number of employees within each year (average wage per employee) or by the total hours
worked (average wage per hour worked). To obtain measures of labor compensation in real
terms, we deate them using the GDP deator. We also have information at the rm level
on the number of hires and separations in each year, as well as a breakdown of the number
of employees between blue- and white-collars.
The empirical counterpart of the two key variables on the rm's international exposure, 
and , are calculated at the rm level for each year. The export share of sales of rm i in
year t, it, is directly provided by SIM. To derive the share of imported inputs in total input
purchases of rm i in year t, it, we had instead to integrate our rm-level data from the two
statistical sources described above with additional information from the 44-industry input-
output table of 1992 for the Italian economy, since this information is not directly available.
As in NP (2001 and 2010), we extracted for each industry j the values of both imported
intermediate inputs and total intermediate inputs (domestically produced and imported).
Then, by using time series information on import demand and production for each industry,
we updated backward and forward the values of input purchases from the input-output table
that refer to one year only. Last, we computed the share of costs on imported inputs in total
input purchases as it =

IMjt
TEjt

TEit
TEit+LCit
, where IMjt is the value of intermediate inputs imported
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by industry j (the industry to which rm i belongs), TEit and TEjt are the values of total
expenditure for intermediate inputs of, respectively, rm i and industry j, and LCit is labor
costs of rm i.
Following the approach developed by Domowitz et al. (1986), we computed a time-varying
measure of each rm's market power as the ratio of the rm's value added net of labor com-
pensation to the value of rm's total production. Ideally, we would use distinct destination-
specic mark-up ratios, for example in the home and the foreign markets. Since our data do
not allow to derive them, we construct a rm's average measure of market power for each
year.
The exchange rates used in the empirical analysis are the permanent components of the
export and import real eective exchange rates of the Italian lira constructed by considering
24 dierent bilateral exchange rates, based on producer price indexes (see Banca d'Italia,
1998). The permanent component has been derived applying the Beveridge and Nelson
(1981) procedure that decomposes a non-stationary series into its permanent and transitory
components (see NP, 2010 for details). Figure 1 shows the time prole of the monthly data
on import and export real exchange rates in the period analyzed (with an increase of the
exchange rates amounting to a real appreciation). While they exhibit a very similar pattern,
some dierences emerge in the mid-eighties and at the beginning of the nineties.
3.2 The Econometric Specication
To assess empirically the wage response to exchange rate uctuations we rely on a baseline
equation which has the following specication:
wit = 0 + 1it 1peert + 2it 1pmert + 3it 1 + 4it 1+
+ 5sit 1 + 6MKUPit 1 + 7lit 1 + b0Zit + i + uit; (19)
where lower-case letters denote the logarithmic transformation of the variable. Wit is the
average wage in real terms paid by rm i at time t (we alternatively use the wage per
employee and the wage per hour); it 1 is the share of sales in foreign markets over total
sales at time t  1; it 1 is the share of production costs for imported inputs in total costs;
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PEERt and PMERt are the permanent components of, respectively, export and import real
eective exchange rates, dened so that an increase in the exchange rate is an appreciation;
MKUPit is an index of rms' market power; Lit is the amount of labor input (according
to the denition of the real wage adopted, we alternatively measure it as the number of
employees and the number of total hours); Sit is the value of real sales; Zit is a vector of
dummy variables controlling for the dierent years, industries, sizes and geographic locations
in which each rm operates. Finally, the specication controls for individual rm latent
heterogeneity including rm-level xed eects, i; uit are the disturbance terms, for which
we assume that E(uit) = E(uituis) = 0, for all t 6= s. The empirical specication is in
rst-dierences in light of the non-stationarity of the exchange rate time series.
The dynamic Eq. (19) is a reduced form, but it is straightforward to see it as the empirical
counterpart of Eq. (18). It therefore allows us to directly test the implications of the
theoretical model. The key variables for characterizing the wage adjustment in response
to currency swings are (i) it 1  peert, the interaction term of the export share of sales
lagged by one period with the export exchange rate variation; and (ii) it 1  pmert, the
interaction term of the lagged share of expenditure for imported inputs in total purchases
with the import exchange rate variation. The advantage of this approach using interaction
terms is that it allows the estimated sensitivity of wages to currency movements to vary across
rms and over time, depending on the evolving external orientation of each specic rm on
both the revenue and cost side (see CG, 2001 and NP, 2010). In other words, the empirical
framework of Eq. (19) allows us to estimate a time-varying and rm-specic response of
rms' labor compensation to exchange rate oscillations, distinguishing between the export
revenues and the imported input cost channels. Of course, the export share of sales and the
share of imported inputs are also inserted in the specication as single regressors in isolation.
The lagged value of changes in the rms' real sales is included to control for demand con-
ditions, and the lagged value of the mark-up ratio to control for any eect of marginal
protability on wages that is independent of exchange rate oscillations. Consistent with
the theoretical set-up (see Eq. 18), the specication includes the lagged value of change in
employment (or hours) to control for the adjustment lags that typically characterizes the
labor market.
As in NP (2001 and 2010), we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator
for dynamic panel data models, which was shown to be ecient within the class of instru-
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mental variable estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Indeed, since in Eq. (19) the lagged
values of the mark-up ratio and of change in employment (hours) and sales are likely to be
correlated with the rm-specic xed eects, i, the endogeneity of these regressors might
cause inconsistency of the parameters estimated with standard panel methods. The GMM
estimator ensures their consistency. Specically, following Arellano and Bover (1995), we
rely on the system GMM panel estimator, which augments the Arellano and Bond (1991) es-
timator by building a system of two equations: the original equation and a transformed one,
where a variety of instruments in levels can also be used. Under this more novel approach,
with the further assumption that rst dierencing the instrumenting variables in the original
equation makes them uncorrelated with xed eects, it is then possible to exploit an even
larger number of orthogonality conditions than before, by resorting to a larger instrument
set. In the estimation we utilize as GMM-type of instruments the lagged values of real sales,
employment (or hours) and of the mark-up dated period t-2 and earlier. The validity of our
specication is ascertained by conducting (i) the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions,
which seeks to verify the orthogonality between instrumental variables and the disturbance
terms and (ii) the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation of residuals of the
transformed equation. We now turn to present and discuss the estimation results.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Baseline Specication
The results from estimating Eq. (19) are presented in table 1. The eect of exchange rate
uctuations on labor compensation in each rm is statistically signicant in terms of both
the average wage per employee (column 1) and per hour (column 2), and the estimated
coecients of the two interaction terms, capturing the eect of currency swings on wages
through, respectively, the foreign sale channel and the imported intermediate inputs channel
have the expected sign. If we focus on the response of the (average) wage per employee
(Column 1) the estimated coecient of it 1  peert is  0:722 with a standard error of
0:140, and the estimated coecient of it 1  pmert is 2:608 with a standard error of
0:753. In the case of wage per hour (Column 2) the estimated coecient of it 1  peert
is  0:760 with a standard error of 0:162, and the estimated coecient of it 1 pmert is
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0:661 with a standard error of 0:336. These results support the theoretical prediction that a
currency depreciation, i.e. a negative variation over time of both peert and pmert causes a
rise in average real wages through the foreign sales side of the balance sheet and to a decline
through the expenditure side. Both eects are estimated to be stronger, respectively, the
higher is the rm's international exposure through exports, i.e. the higher is it 1, and the
higher is the rm's reliance on imported inputs, i.e. the higher is it 1.
Naturally, a question arises as to whether an exchange rate appreciation leads to a rise
or fall of the labor compensation set by the rm. As argued in NP (2010), our empirical
framework is not the most suitable one for ascertaining the aggregate eect of exchange
rate swings on wages. On the contrary, the primary advantage of our approach is that it
allows to capture the rm-specic relevance of each transmission channel. This implies that
a rm-specic, rather than an aggregate, wage response to exchange rates can be estimated
on our microeconomic data for each period. To do so, consider rst the mean value of both
the export share of sales, it, and the share of imported input costs, it, equal to 0:298 and
0:139, respectively. If we evaluate the shares reecting external orientation at these mean
values, and use, for example, the estimation results reported in Column 2 of Table 1, the
estimated elasticity of wage per hour to exchange rate change is  0:134. This means that
the eect of a one per cent currency depreciation on the hourly wage for a hypothetical rm
with this type of foreign exposure is a 0:13 per cent real wage expansion. However, if instead
of considering a hypothetical rm exhibiting average shares, we consider rms' heterogeneity
in terms of external orientation, by focusing on the dierence between import and export
shares,     and in particular on the rms at the 25th, median and 75th percentile of the
distribution of this dierence, we obtain rather dierent results. For the rm at the 25th
percentile (with  = 0:09 and  = 0:44), based on the results documented in table 1 column
2, a one per cent currency depreciation determines a 0:27 per cent rise of real wages per hour.
For the median rm (with  = 0:12 and  = 0:22), hourly wages rises by 0:09 per cent. For
the rm at the 75th percentile (with  = 0:08 and  = 0:01), hourly wages would drop by
0:05 per cent after a one per cent (export and import) exchange rate depreciation. Figure 2
shows how the estimated eect on wages of a one per cent currency depreciation varies with
the export share of sales and with the share of costs of imported inputs on total costs. These
results point to a high degree of heterogeneity across rms, suggesting that the analysis of
average values may hide substantial recomposition eects within and across industries.
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The estimation results also document that the rm's prot margin as measured by the mark-
up ratio, MKUPit 1, exerts a positive eects on wages, and so does the lagged change in
employment (or hours), lit 1. On the contrary, the change in total sales, included in the
specication as a control variable, has no statistically signicant eect on wage per employee,
while it has a negative and statistically signicant eect on wage per hour, possibly owing to
the lower hourly cost of overtime employment. As already discussed above, the specication
includes a number of dummy variables. We report the value of the Wald tests for the
joint signicance of each group of dummies, indicating that all these eects are statistically
signicant. Evidence on the validity of our baseline specication in both columns 1 and 2
is provided by the values of the Hansen statistic for over-identifying restrictions and of the
test for absence of second-order serial correlation of residuals.
4.2 The Role of Market Power
A notable implication of the theoretical framework of section 2 is that, for a given inter-
national exposure, the sensitivity of wages to exchange rate uctuations is larger for rms
with a lower market power in the product markets. We verify empirically this hypothesis
estimating our baseline specication on two dierent sub-samples obtained using the me-
dian value of rms' mark-ups as the separating threshold (see CG, 2001 and NP, 2010).
The estimation results, reported in table 2, show that the eect of exchange rate swings on
(average) labor compensation both per employee and per hour is stronger for rms with a
lower mark-up ratio. If we focus, for example, on the impact on compensations per hour, the
estimated eect through the cost side is 3:751 with a standard error of 1:204 for the rms
with relatively low pricing power, which is indeed larger compared to the corresponding one
for rms with higher pricing power (in this case it is 0:528 with a standard error of 0:318;
see columns 3 and 4 of table 2). By the same token, the estimated impact of exchange rate
through the revenue side is  1:182 with a standard error of 0:229 in the case of rms with
lower market power, while it is  0:302 (with a standard error of 0:137) for rms exhibiting
higher pricing power in the product markets. Similar results are obtained considering the
impact on wages per employee.
To analyze this issue in more detail we also modify the baseline specication. In partic-
ular, we replace the two key explanatory variables in our regression, namely the interac-
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tion terms between exchange rate variations and the variables of rm's international expo-
sure (respectively, it 1  peert and it 1  pmert) with two new interaction terms that
comprise also the rm's level of market power, i.e. MKUPit 1, as a further multiplica-
tive term. Specically, the new regressors are (i) it 1  peert  (1  MKUPit 1) and (ii)
it 1 pmert  (1 MKUPit 1).
The theoretical model predicts that a depreciation (i.e. a negative value of peert) would
increase wages through the revenue side and the impact is expected to be stronger the higher
is the share of exports from sale and the lower is the price mark-up. Therefore, a negative
estimate of the parameter for the interaction term for the revenue side would lend empirical
support to this prediction. Indeed, table 3 shows that the estimated coecient is  1:100
(with a standard error of 0:184) when we consider labor compensation per employee and
 0:513 (with a standard error of 0:163) when we consider labor compensation per hour. On
the other hand, we expect a depreciation to reduce wages through the cost side with the
size of the impact being higher (in absolute value) the higher is the share of expenditure on
imported input over total costs and the lower is the price mark-up. Estimating a positive
parameter for the interaction term on the cost side would support the model's prediction
and this is the result we obtain. Indeed, the estimated coecient is positive and statistically
signicant when we consider both labor compensation per employee (2:461 with a standard
error of 0:848; see table 3, column 1) and labor compensation per hour (0:706 with a standard
error of 0:342; see table 3, column 2).
4.3 The Dierent Degree of Import Penetration
To further characterize the linkage between exchange rate and wages we analyze some addi-
tional features that may contribute to shape the sensitivity of rm level wages to currency
shocks.
So far, we have emphasized foreign exposure of a rm as captured by both the extent of
the exporting activity and the incidence of imported intermediate inputs. However, the
rm is exposed to international competition also in the domestic product markets, and the
degree to which this happens depends on (i) the extent of import penetration in the domestic
industry to which a rm belongs and (ii) the share of rm's sales in the domestic market
over total sales. As we discussed in Section 2, the more relevant are import penetration
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and the rm's exposure to domestic revenues, the more severe is the competitive pressure
exerted by foreign producers in the rm's domestic market. This channel introduces another
degree of dierence across rms in the estimated impact of exchange rate movements on
labor compensation. To account for this eect, following NP (2010), we therefore consider
the following specication:
wit = 0 + 1it 1peert + 2it 1pmert + 3it 1 + 4it 1+
+5sit 1+6MKUPit 1+7lit 1+
KX
j=1
[j(1  it 1)IPjt 1peertDj]+b0Zit+i+uit;
(20)
which is identical to Eq. (19), except for the inclusion of the summation term, that is
composed by: (i) Dj, which is a dummy variable for each industry j (with j = 1; 2; :::K)
and is equal to one if rm i belongs to industry j and zero otherwise; (ii) IPjt 1, the (lagged
value of the) industry j's import penetration ratio, as measured by the share of imports of
products j over domestic demand for those products, obtained as the industry's sales plus
the imports of products of industry j minus the industry's exports; (iii) (1  it 1), that is
the ratio of domestic sales to total sales and reects the degree of rm's exposure on the
domestic product market. All these variables interact with the export exchange rate change,
so that for each industry we can estimate an industry-specic coecient, j, associated with
the corresponding interaction term. These coecients are expected to be negative, because
a currency depreciation (a fall of peert) augments the rm's competitiveness in the domestic
market, thus increasing its protability through the domestic revenue side and thereby the
equilibrium wages. Moreover, the size of this eect will vary across rms depending on
the relevance of domestic sales in total sales and on the extent of import penetration. This
hypothesis is conrmed by the results from estimating the model in Eq. 20, that are reported
in table 4. The coecients of the two key interaction terms have the expected sign and are
statistically signicant. In analyzing the industry-specic values of the estimated coecients
j, capturing the eect of exchange rate on wages through import penetration, we rst test
whether they are dierent among each others, conducting a Wald test. Indeed, the null
hypothesis of identical industry-specic coecients is strongly rejected (with a p-value of
0:00). In Table 5 we also report the values for each industry j of the estimated wage
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sensitivity to exchange rate through the import penetration channel, that we computed
combining the value of the coecient j with (i) the corresponding industry-specic average
value across rms and over time of (1   it 1) and (iii) the time average of IPjt for the
industry. In the large majority of industries (12 out of 15) the estimated wage elasticity to
exchange rate through the import penetration channel has the expected negative sign. To
gauge whether these estimates are sensible, in Table 5 we compare these estimates of the
elasticities with the corresponding values of import penetration for each industry that we
reported in Table 5, together with the associated rank. As in NP (2010) for the employment
elasticity, the estimated impact of exchange rate on wages through the domestic sales side is
larger for industries exhibiting a higher degree of import penetration. The strongest eects
are recorded for Electrical Machinery and for Computers and Oce equipments. For the
latter industry, the extent of import penetration is very high (58 per cent; ranked n. 1) and
for Electrical Machinery it is also sizeable (29 per cent; ranked n. 4). We have also computed
the Spearman's rank correlation between the (absolute values of the) estimated industry-
specic wage responses on the domestic sale side and the indexes of import penetration of
the corresponding industries. With a value of the Spearman correlation of 0:65, the null
hypothesis that these two variables are independent is rejected at the 1 per cent level of
statistical signicance.5
5We have also focused in more details on the eects through the cost side, with a possible source of speci-
city being the dierent degree of substitutability between imported and domestically produced intermediate
inputs. After a depreciation, that increases the price of imported inputs in the domestic currency, a rm
may decide to replace its imports of intermediate goods with similar goods that are domestically produced.
Arguably, the extent to which this happens may reect technological and organizational characteristics of
the rm, that are shared by the rms in the same industry. If the degree of this substitutability is relatively
high (low), then the wage sensitivity to exchange rate through the cost side channel would be relatively low
(high). To investigate this issue, we estimate an equation that is identical to Eq. (19), except for the eect
of it 1PMERt on wages that is estimated separately for each industry. To ascertain if the dierences
between the estimated coecients summarizing the cost-side eects of exchange rate on wages are signicant,
we performed a Wald test for the null hypothesis that these dierences are equal to zero. The value of the
test is 68:7 with a p-value of 0:00, indicating that dierences across industries in the wage sensitivity through
the cost side are statistically signicant.
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4.4 The Share of Newly Hired Workers and the Composition of
the Workforce
Goldberg and Tracy (2003) point to three dierent channels of transmission of an exchange
rate shock to the worker's wage. In addition to the standard channel of on-the-job wage
adjustment in the aftermath of the shock, exchange rate may also inuence (i) the likelihood
of a job switch and (ii) the size of the revision of the worker's wage conditional to a job
transition. Using micro-labor data on individual employees, they document a signicant
eect of exchange rate on the amount of the worker's wage adjustment associated with a
job switch. Kletzer (2000) and Goldberg and Tracy (2003) show that, while a change in,
respectively, foreign competition and the currency value account for only a modest share
of job displacement, on the other hand job changing does aect the sensitivity of wages to
exchange rate (or foreign competition) through the impact of currency swings on the size of
the wage adjustment after the job transition.
To address this issue using our rm-level data, we focus on the hiring rate for each rm in
a given year and investigate whether rms that are similar in all dimensions (e.g. foreign
exposure), except for the percentage of newly hired employees in a given year, do exhibit
a dierent responsiveness of the (average) wage to an exchange rate shock. A relatively
large size of the hiring rate in a given year implies that the rm has among its employees a
relatively large share of job changers, who have switched job in that year. To appraise this
eect on the rm's wage sensitivity to exchange rate, we consider an empirical specication
which includes the time-varying rm's hiring rate, hirrit. Specically, we augment the
two interaction terms between the exchange rate variation and the indicators of the rm's
international orientation (respectively, it 1 and it 1) with the hiring rate. The two key
regressors therefore become (i) it 1  peert  hirrit and (ii) it 1  PMERt  hirrit. Of
course, the term hirrit also enters in isolation in the specication, exactly as it 1 and it 1
do. The hiring rate is computed as the number of newly hired workers in a given year divided
by the total number of employees (the latter is calculated as the simple average between the
rm's employment level in periods t and t  1; see e.g. Klein, Schuh and Triest, 2003).
Table 6 documents that the wage sensitivity to exchange rate tends to increase with the rate
of rm's hires in a given year. Indeed, we estimate that the higher is hirrit the stronger is
the wage responsiveness to the currency shock along both channels of transmission related
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to the exposure of rm prots to international markets (the one through foreign sales and
the one through expenditure on imported intermediate inputs). For example, if we focus on
the (average) wage per employee, the estimated eect of exchange rate on the export side is
negative and statistically signicant (-3.875 with a standard error of 1.097) and the one on
the imported input side is positive and signicant (9.765 with a standard error of 3.495). For
an identical degree of foreign exposure, the impact of exchange rate on wages tend therefore
to be more pronounced in those rms with a higher proportion of newly hired workers.
Interestingly, when taken in isolation, the hiring rate has no statistically signicant eect
on wages. Although a thorough investigation of this issue would require data at both the
rm and individual worker level, we argue that this nding on rm-level data complements
the one uncovered by Goldberg and Tracy (2003) on data on individual workers that do not
control for the rm's characteristics.6
Finally, we focus on the composition of the rm's workforce by occupational group and
ask ourselves whether this aects the wage sensitivity to currency swings. We nd that it
does. In particular, although our data do not provide information on the characteristics
of individual employees, we have however information for each rm and in each year on
the composition of the rm's workers by type (blue-collar vis-a-vis white-collar). We there-
fore consider a specication in which we augment the two key interaction terms related to
the rm's international exposure with the ratio of white-collars to total workers, whcoit: (i)
it 1 peert whcoit; and (ii) it 1 pmert whcoit. The specication also includes the term
whcoit entering in isolation. In Table 7 we report the results on how the wage responsiveness
to exchange rate swings is aected by the composition of the rm workforce by type. The
higher is the proportion of white-collar workers in the rm, whcoit, the stronger is the wage
sensitivity to the exchange rate through the rm exposure to both foreign sales and expen-
diture for imported intermediate inputs. For example, the estimated eect of an exchange
6We also focused on another measure of job ows, namely the job reallocation rate, jrrit, obtained as
the sum of the hiring rate dened earlier and the job separation rate (i.e. the ratio between the number of
separations in each year, t, and the simple average between the rm's employment in periods t and t   1).
When the two key regressors of the baseline specication are augmented as follows: it 1  peert  jrrit
and 2) it 1 pmert  jrrit, the estimation results suggest that a relatively high degree of job turnover in
the rm magnies the eect of exchange rate change on wages through prot adjustment. In particular,
the estimated coecient associated to the rst variable is -1.486 with a standard error of 0.420 and the one
associated to the second variable is 6.984 with a standard error of 1.838 (the whole set of regression results
are not reported for space constraints).
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rate appreciation on the (average) wage per employee is negative and statistically signicant
(-1.419 with a standard error of 0.478) through the export side and this implies that, for a
given exposure, the higher the proportion of white-collars (whcoit) the stronger is the eect.
On the other hand, the estimated eect of an exchange rate appreciation on the wage is pos-
itive and statistically signicant through the side of expenditure for imported inputs (6.605
with a standard error of 1.298). For a given international exposure, the higher the incidence
of white-collar workers, the higher is therefore the eect of exchange rate on wage. The same
result is obtained by estimating a simple panel specication in which the estimated rm-
specic exchange rate elasticities of wages to exchange rate swings is regressed on the rm's
ratio of white-collar employees to total workers (see CG, 2001). In particular, the dependent
variable is derived from the results of table 1 (column 1) as (2:608 it 1 0:722 it 1). The
regression results indicate that a higher incidence in the rm of the white-collar employees
(vis-a-vis the blue-collars) is conducive to a higher estimated wage sensitivity to exchange
rate uctuations. The estimated coecient is 0.062 with a standard error of 0.014.
Finally, we also combined the two issues addressed in this section by investigating whether
the wage sensitivity to exchange rate shaped by the rate of rm's hires is in turn aected by
the composition of the workforce by occupational category. In particular, we split the sample
based on the proportion of white-collars in total workers and analyze whether the estimated
eects associated to the variables it 1 peert hirrit and it 1 pmert hirrit are dierent
depending on the composition of the workforce. It turns out that it does. In particular, as
documented in Table 8, the eects are larger in those rms where the proportion of white-
collar employees is higher than the overall median across rms. If we focus for example
on the side of revenues from exporting activities, the estimated coecient is -2.465 (with a
standard error of 0.472) for rms with a relatively low proportion of white-collars employee,
while it is equal to -4.556 (with a standard error of 0.920) for rms where the incidence of
white-collars workers is higher.
5 Concluding Remarks
Using data on a representative panel of manufacturing rms we nd that exchange rate
uctuations do aect the labor compensation set by each rm. Similar to the analysis in
NP (2010) on the response of employment and hours conducted on the same microeconomic
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data, we nd that the direction and size of wage adjustment is determined by the external
orientation of each rm on both the revenue and cost side of its balance sheet. Through the
revenue side, a currency depreciation aects rm's protability and thereby the equilibrium
outcome of wages. The latter are shown to rise along this channel and the eect is estimated
to be larger the higher is the rm's exposure to revenues from exporting. On the other hand,
a depreciation leads to a reduction of the rm's wages through the channel of expenditure
for imported inputs and the eect is larger the higher is the rm's reliance on imported
vis-a-vis domestically produced inputs. Our results indicate that, for a given type of rm's
international exposure, the responsiveness of wages to exchange rate is more pronounced for
rms with a lower degree of pricing power.
To provide further characterizations of the wage sensitivity, we also document that other
transmission channels introduce a signicant source of heterogeneity across rms in the
response of wages to exchange rate swings. These include the extent of competition in the
domestic marked exerted by foreign producers, as measured by the import penetration in
the domestic industry to which a rm belongs. We also analyze the percentage of newly
hired workers of a rm in a given year and document that a larger presence in the rm of job
changers aects the size of wage adjustment in response to exchange rate variations. Finally,
we nd that the composition of the rm's workforce by occupational category does inuence
the sensitivity of wages to exchange rate, with the latter being higher, ceteris paribus, when
the incidence in the rm of white-collar employees is relatively large.
Overall, our results highlight a further channel through which currency oscillations can have
signicant eects on the real economy. Most important, these eects show wide dierences,
even in their sign, depending on individual rm's characteristics. Beyond average eects,
currency oscillations can therefore have substantial redistributive eects within and across
industries.
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Figure 1
Real import and export exchange rates (1998 = 100)
Source: Bank of Italy.
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Figure 2
The heterogeneous impact of a one per cent depreciation on wages depending on the
external orientation of rms
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Table 1
The Eect of Exchange Rate Change on Wages
(1) (2)
Variable Labor compensation Labor compensation
per employee: wit per hour: whit
it 1 pmert 2:608 0:661
(0:753) (0:336)
it 1 peert  0:722  0:760
(0:140) (0:162)
it 1 0:251 0:263
(0:036) (0:047)
it 1  0:004  0:003
(0:003) 0:004
MKUPit 1 0:126 0:053
(0:013) (0:016)
sit 1 0:001  0:011
(0:003) (0:004)
lit 1 0:046 0:069
(0:009) (0:012)
Constant  0:045  0:018
(0:010) (0:012)
Year dummies 809:4 (0:0) 192:1 (0:0)
Industry dummies 168:9 (0:0) 117:6 (0:0)
Geography dummies 10:0 (0:0) 3:8 (0:4)
Firm size dummies 12:7 (0:0) 26:5 (0:0)
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: 283:5 (0:13) 276:8 (0:20)
Test for second-order serial correlation 1:26 (0:21) 0:81 (0:42)
Number of observations 6; 580 6; 447
Notes: The system GMM dynamic panel methodology is used for estimation. it 1 is the share of expendi-
ture for imported inputs and it 1 is the export share of sales. pmert and peert are the (log) changes
in the permanent component of, respectively, the import and export exchange rate. sit 1 is the (log)
variation of real sales and MKUPit 1 is the rm's mark-up ratio. lit 1 is the (log) variation of labor input
and is measured as number of employees in column 1 and as number of hours in column 2. Size dummies
refer to these sizes: 50-99, 100-199, 200-499, 500-999, 1000 employees. Geographic dummies refer to North-
West, North-East, Center, South, Islands. For each group of dummies we report the value of Wald test of
their joint signicance and the associated p-value. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
reported in parentheses. The instrument set includes lagged values of changes of labor inputs, sales and the
mark-up dated t-2 and earlier. Hansen is a test of over-identifying restrictions asymptotically distributed as
a 2. We also report the value of the test for second-order autocorrelation of the dierenced residuals (the
p-values are reported in parenthes). Sample period: 1984-1998.  denotes signicance at the 5% condence
level and  at the 10%.
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Table 2
Exchange rate, Market Power and Wage Adjustment (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Compensation per employee: wit Compensation per hour: whit
Degree of market power Degree of market power
Low High Low High
it 1 pmert 2:848 2:743 3:751 0:528
(0:819) (0:891) (1:204) (0:318)
it 1 peert  1:281  0:375  1:182  0:302
(0:163) (0:170) (0:229) (0:137)
it 1 0:368 0:215 0:366 0:285
(0:055) (0:049) (0:068) (0:048)
it 1  0:007  0:001  0:007 0:001
(0:005) (0:004) (0:006) (0:005)
sit 1 0:016  0:016  0:006  0:018
(0:003) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003)
MKUPit 1 0:127 0:168 0:114 0:194
(0:012) (0:034) (0:015) (0:027)
lit 1 0:083  0:015 0:147 0:072
(0:010) (0:014) (0:009) (0:009)
Constant  0:053  0:051  0:006  0:058
(0:013) (0:015) (0:019) (0:015)
Year dummies 430:2 (0:0) 489:3 (0:0) 121:0 (0:0) 210:3 (0:0)
Industry dummies 76:2 (0:0) 85:1 (0:0) 36:5 (0:0) 137:3 (0:0)
Geography dummies 14:0 (0:0) 15:7 (0:0) 15:2 (0:0) 18:9 (0:0)
Firm size dummies 6:8 (0:2) 10:0 (0:0) 12:5 (0:0) 24:4 (0:0)
Hansen test of
over-identifying restrictions 260:9 (0:16) 210:5 (0:09) 248:8 (0:17) 275:5 (0:22)
Test for second-order
serial correlation 1:18 (0:24) 1:82 (0:07) 0:60 (0:55)  0:54 (0:59)
Number of observations 3; 335 3; 245 3; 123 3; 212
Notes: see Table 1. The system GMM dynamic panel methodology is used for estimation. The sample is
split based on the degree of rms'market power. The threshold criterion is the median of rms'mark-up.
Variables in lower-case letters denote their logarithmic transformation.  denotes signicance at the 5%
condence level and  at the 10% level.
31
Table 3
Exchange rate, Market Power and Wage Adjustment (II)
Variable Real Wages: wit
(1) (2)
Labor compensation Labor compensation
per employee: wit per hour: whit
it 1 pmert  (1 MKUPit 1) 2:461 0:706
(0:848) (0:342)
it 1 peert  (1 MKUPit 1)  1:100  0:513
(0:184) (0:163)
it 1 0:248 0:244
(0:040) (0:044)
it 1  0:005 0:001
(0:004) (0:004)
sit 1  0:001  0:003
(0:004) (0:004)
MKUPit 1 0:141 0:052
(0:016) (0:015)
lit 1 0:048 0:083
(0:011) (0:012)
Constant  0:048  0:014
(0:010) (0:011)
Year dummies 576:2 (0:00) 187:0 (0:00)
Industry dummies 142:0 (0:00) 62:3 (0:00)
Geography dummies 11:2 (0:02) 3:7 (0:45)
Firm size dummies 9:9 (0:04) 20:6 (0:00)
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: 229:3 (0:09) 275:1 (0:22)
Test for second-order serial correlation 1:29 (0:20) 0:74 (0:46)
Number of observations 6; 579 6; 220
Notes: see Table 1. The system GMM dynamic panel methodology is used for estimation. Variables in
lower-case letters denote their logarithmic transformation.  denotes signicance at the 5% condence level
and  at the 10% level.
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Table 4
Exchange Rate, Import Penetration and Wage Adjustment
Variable Labor compensation
per employee: wit
it 1 pmert 5:809
(2:482)
it 1 peert  2:130
(1:0841)
(1  it 1) peert  IP1t 1 D1, (1  it 1) peert  IP2t 1 D2,.... Wald test:
...,(1  it 1) peert  IPKt 1 DK 40:3 (p-val: 0:00)
it 1 0:120
(0:063)
it 1  0:009
(0:005)
sit 1  0:001
(0:004)
MKUPit 1 0:033
(0:014)
lit 1  0:017
(0:016)
Constant  0:009
(0:031)
Year dummies 219:0 (0:00)
Industry dummies 52:8 (0:00)
Geography dummies 11:9 (0:02)
Firm size dummies 5:2 (0:27)
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: 175:2 (0:40)
Test for second-order serial correlation 1:50 (0:13)
Number of observations 5; 183
Notes: see Table 1. The system GMM dynamic panel methodology is used for estimation. IPjt is the value of
import penetration experienced by industry j (to which rm i belongs) in the year t. Dj is the j-th industry
dummy, taking the value of one if rm i belongs to industry j and zero otherwise. The Wald statistic
associated with the variables (1   it 1)  peert  IPjt 1  Dj (j=1,2,..., K ) tests for the joint hypothesis
that their coecients are equal. Variables in lower-case letters denote their logarithmic transformation. 
denotes signicance at the 5% condence level and  at the 10% level.
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Table 5
Import Penetration across Industries and the Sensitivity of Wage to Exchange Rate
Import Wage Response through
Industry penetration import penetration
Value Rank Estimate Rank
Transformation of non metalliferous minerals 0:10 14 0:77 13
Chemicals 0:35 3  1:08 6
Metals 0:05 15  1:00 7
Machinery for industry and agriculture 0:25 5  0:61 9
Computers, oce equipments, precision instruments 0:58 1  1:67 2
Electrical machinery 0:29 4  2:21 1
Motor-cars and other transport equipments 0:54 2  1:46 3
Food and tobacco products 0:16 7  1:19 5
Textiles 0:16 8  0:49 11
Leather and footwear 0:17 6  1:19 4
Clothing 0:14 12  0:56 10
Wood and furniture 0:15 11  0:13 12
Paper and publishing 0:12 13  0:73 8
Rubber and plastic products 0:15 9 0:97 14
Other manufactures 0:15 10 1:39 15
Notes: To derive import penetration for each industry and the industry-specic estimated response of wages
to exchange rate through import penetration see the discussion in the text. The industry-specic wage
responses are obtained from the estimation results documented in Table 4; the ranks of these estimated
eects pertains to their absolute values.
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Table 6
Exchange rate, Newly Hired Workers and Wage Adjustment
Variable Real Wages: wit
(1) (2)
Labor compensation Labor compensation
per employee: wit per hour: whit
it 1 pmert  hirrit 9:765 8:246
(3:495) (3:416)
it 1 peert  hirrit  3:875  4:508
(1:097) (1:391)
hirrit  0:007  0:020
(0:007) (0:007)
it 1 0:254 0:247
(0:037) (0:047)
it 1  0:002  0:001
(0:003) (0:004)
sit 1 0:001  0:008
(0:003) (0:004)
mkupit 1 0:121 0:051
(0:013) (0:016)
lit 1 0:043 0:065
(0:001) (0:013)
Constant  0:045  0:010
(0:010) (0:012)
Year dummies 807:2 (0:00) 195:2 (0:00)
Industry dummies 190:7 (0:00) 116:9 (0:00)
Geography dummies 7:1 (0:13) 3:5 (0:47)
Firm size dummies 9:7 (0:05) 25:0 (0:00)
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: 279:9 (0:17) 275:6 (0:22)
Test for second-order serial correlation 1:20 (0:23) 0:82 (0:41)
Number of observations 6; 580 6; 447
Notes: see Table 1. The system GMM dynamic panel methodology is used for estimation. Variables in
lower-case letters denote their logarithmic transformation. hirrit is the hiring rate as dened in the text.

denotes signicance at the 5% condence level and  at the 10% level.
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Table 7
Exchange rate, the Composition of the Workforce by Type and Wage Adjustment
Variable Real Wages: wit
(1) (2)
Labor compensation Labor compensation
per employee: wit per hour: whit
it 1 pmert  whcoit 6:605 2:501
(1:298) (0:669)
it 1 peert  whcoit  1:419  0:994
(0:478) (0:496)
whcoit 0:019
  0:001
(0:006) (0:007)
it 1 0:228 0:229
(0:039) (0:048)
it 1  0:002  0:003
(0:003) (0:004)
sit 1  0:001  0:009
(0:003) (0:004)
mkupit 1 0:137 0:051
(0:015) (0:017)
nit 1 0:041 0:067
(0:010) (0:013)
Constant  0:047  0:010
(0:010) (0:012)
Year dummies 681:4 (0:00) 181:9 (0:00)
Industry dummies 166:3 (0:00) 95:3 (0:00)
Geography dummies 11:4 (0:02) 5:1 (0:27)
Firm size dummies 15:4 (0:00) 21:8 (0:00)
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: 254:7 (0:15) 258:6 (0:11)
Test for second-order serial correlation 1:20 (0:23) 0:76 (0:45)
Number of observations 6; 580 6; 447
Notes: see Table 1. The system GMM dynamic panel methodology is used for estimation. Variables in lower-
case letters denote their logarithmic transformation. whcoit is the proportion of white-collar employees in
total workers.  denotes signicance at the 5% condence level and  at the 10% level.
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Table 8
Exchange rate, Firm's Hires and the Composition of the Workforce
Variable Real Wages per employee: wit
(1) (2)
Firms with a higher proportion Firms with a lower proportion
of white-collars (High whcoit) of white-collars (Low whcoit)
it 1 pmert  hirrit 11:915 6:560
(2:218) (1:912)
it 1 peert  hirrit  4:556  2:465
(0:920) (0:472)
hirrit 0:020
  0:002
(0:007) (0:004)
it 1 0:520 0:105
(0:050) (0:037)
it 1 0:014  0:002
(0:004) (0:003)
sit 1 0:009  0:018
(0:002) (0:005)
mkupit 1 0:095 0:067
(0:011) (0:013)
nit 1 0:073 0:014
(0:008) (0:009)
Constant  0:090  0:029
(0:015) (0:009)
Year dummies 824:6 (0:00) 758:4 (0:00)
Industry dummies 222:6 (0:00) 64:4 (0:00)
Geography dummies 14:5 (0:01) 30:5 (0:47)
Firm size dummies 31:4 (0:00) 21:7 (0:00)
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions: 288:1 (0:10) 250:7 (0:62)
Test for second-order serial correlation 1:12 (0:26) 1:53 (0:13)
Number of observations 3; 265 3; 315
Notes: see Table 1. The system GMM dynamic panel methodology is used for estimation. Variables in
lower-case letters denote their logarithmic transformation. hirrit is the hiring rate as dened in the text
and whcoit is the proportion of white-collar employees in total workers.
 denotes signicance at the 5%
condence level and  at the 10% level.
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